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Should the End Justify the Means? United States v. Matta-BaUesteros
and the Demise of the Supervisory Powers
I. Introduction
The end justifies the means. That appears to be the message sent
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Matta-Ballesteros' and other
recent decisions refusing to utilize the powers of the federal courts to
discourage misconduct by U.S. law enforcement agents and federal
prosecutors.2 When the end achieved is the trial of suspected drug
dealers and murderers in the United States, the means of bringing
such suspects to justice can now involve covert operations by U.S.
agents to kidnap them and spirit them away from their homes in
foreign countries.3
Frustrated with the diplomatic and legal hurdles involved in
extraditing suspected criminals from their countries of refuge, law
enforcement agents have begun resorting to less traditional means of
bringing suspected criminals to justice in the United States.4 In some
cases, including that of Matta-Ballesteros, such non-traditional means
allegedly have included torture with electric stun guns, extensive
beatings, and secretly arranged flights under the cover of night.5 Even
full-scale military invasion has been utilized to capture one political
leader suspected of participating in drug trafficking.6
Toward the middle of this century, the federal courts, following
the example set by the U.S. Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States,7
appeared somewhat less willing to sanction conduct by law enforce-
ment agents or prosecutors that the courts deemed to be uncivilized
or outrageous.' Exercising what became known as their supervisory
powers, the federal courts dismissed some cases rather than preside
1 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Matta-Ballesteros
v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990).
3 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990). While the federal agents involved in the abductions
have admitted to participating in the kidnappings themselves, they have denied beating or
torturing the suspects. See, e.g., 71 F.3d 754.
4 For an article tracing the history of extradition laws and the resort to international
abductions by U.S. agents, see Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement
in the International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813 (1993).
5 See Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 761; United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp.
599, 602-603 (C.D. Cal. 1990) rev'd, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
6 See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
7 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
8 See infra notes 112-33 and accompanying text.
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over proceedings in which evidence or defendants had improperly
been brought before them.'
Recently, however, the federal courts once again have taken their
cue from the Supreme Court in pulling back from the liberal exercise
of their supervisory powers. 10 Where international abductions by
federal agents are involved, the result has often been increased
tensions between the United States and other countries." In addi-
tion, with no reason to fear reprisals by the courts in the form of
dismissals, federal agents have been written virtual blank checks to
continue unorthodox and internationally condemned methods of
bringing suspects to justice.
This Note explores the Ninth Circuit's decision in Matta-Ballesteros,
in which the court refused to exercise its supervisory powers to dismiss
a case involving the international abduction of a suspected drug
trafficker by U.S. Marshals. 2 Part II details the facts and holding of
the case, including a noteworthy argument by the concurrence."
Contrary to the majority, Judge Noonan indicated his belief that Matta-
Ballesteros-but for a minor technicality-was a case that ordinarily
would have cried out for dismissal. Part III traces the history of the
federal courts' supervisory powers -and explores other pertinent
background law. 4 Part IV analyzes the Matta-Ballesteros decision itself,
determining the case's significance in light of the background law. 5
Finally, this Note concludes in Part V that, even considering the
technicality raised by Judge Noonan, the Ninth Circuit should have
used the opportunity presented by Matta-Ballesteros to exercise its
supervisory powers and dismiss the case.'" This Note also concludes
that the trend toward more restrictive use of supervisory powers has
the potential to exacerbate international relations precisely at a time
when cooperation among countries in crime prevention and punish-
ment is imperative.17
9 See, e.g., McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341; Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946);
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975). See also Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d
1182, 1187 (9th Cir.), aFOd on reh'g, 483 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1973), for a listing of more than
thirty cases in which the lower federal courts have exercised their supervisory powers.
10 See infra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
11 The decision in Alvarez-Machain, for example, sparked protests not only from Mexi-
co-the country from which the suspect was abducted-but from other countries around the
world, including long-time friends of the United States, such as Canada, Switzerland and
Australia. SeeUnited States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992);Jonathan A. Bush, Essay,
How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 941-42 &
n.12 (1993).
12 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 760-61.
13 See infr notes 18-111 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 112-227 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 228-63 and accompanying text.
16 See infra part V.
17 See infta part V.
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II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran, became involved in
a marijuana and cocaine trafficking enterprise with seven Mexican
nationals in 1982 or 1983.8 The enterprise, which was centered in
Guadalajara, Mexico, included several marijuana ranches in various
Mexican locations. 9 Together with Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo, one
of the seven Mexican nationals, Matta-Ballesteros was directly involved
in importing large amounts of cocaine into the United States.2 °
In September 1984, members of the enterprise-not including
Matta-Ballesteros-met and discussed several large seizures of
marijuana and cocaine that had been made by the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) .21 The suggestion was made at
the September meeting that the DEA agent responsible for the seizures
should be "picked up."22  This suggestion was repeated at two
subsequent meetings-at which Matta-Ballesteros was present-held
one month later in Guadalajara.23  By December 1984, the drug
traffickers had identified Special Agent Enrique Camarena as the DEA
agent responsible for the seizures, and one of the enterprise members
indicated that he would "take care of' him.24 Camarena disappeared
after he left the DEA office in Guadalajara on February 7, 1985.25 It
was later determined that Camarena had been taken to a house at 881
Lope del Vega, in Guadalajara, where he was tortured, interrogated,
and killed.26
An investigation conducted at Lope del Vega determined that
Matta-Ballesteros had been at the home some time after January
1985.27 In addition, Matta-Ballesteros was seen leaving a hotel in
Guadalajara on February 12, 1985.28 Matta-Ballesteros was subse-
quently detained by police in Colombia on charges unrelated to
18 Matta-Balesteros, 71 F.3d at 760.
19 Id.
20 Id. Matta-Ballesteros and Felix-Gallardo grossed over $5 million a week at one point
during their operations. Id.
21 Id. at 760-61.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 761.
24 Id. This statement was attributed to Ernesto Fonseca-Carillo, the Mexican national
who identified Camarena. Id.
25 Id. Earlier that month, four of the Mexican nationals had met again to discuss
picking Camarena up to find out what he knew concerning the enterprise and who was
cooperating with him. Id.
26 Id. This determination was made from "[o]ut of court statements, audiotapes and
physical evidence, including hair, carpet fibers, sheet fabric and rope strands .... Id.
27 Id. The house was recarpeted in January 1985, and hairs consistent with those of
Matta-Ballesteros were found in the guest house and bedroom. Id.
28 Id.
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Camarena's murder on April 29, 1985.29 The police then took him
to Bogota to be interviewed by DEA agents, where he denied partici-
pating in Camarena's murder but said that he did know of it."0
Although the United States attempted to extradite Matta-Ballesteros on
an unrelated criminal complaint filed in the Southern District of New
York, the extradition was unsuccessful, 3  and Matta-Ballesteros
returned to Honduras. 2
Just before dawn on April 5, 1988, four U.S. Marshals and
Honduran Special Troops abducted Matta-Ballesteros from his home
in Tegucigulpa, Honduras. His hands were bound, a black hood
was placed over his head, and he was thrust on the floor of a car
driven by a one of the Marshals.34 The Marshal then drove Matta-
Ballesteros to a U.S. Air Force Base in Honduras, where he was placed
on a plane and flown to the United States, via the Dominican
Republic. 35 Matta-Ballesteros was detained in the federal penitentiary
at Marion, Illinois.36 Although Matta-Ballesteros alleged that-at the
direction of the U.S. Marshals-he was beaten and burned with a stun
gun during the trip to the Air Force Base and during the subsequent
flight, the government denied these charges. 37 However, the United
States did admit to participating in the abduction from Honduras.
3 8
Matta-Ballesteros made an unsuccessful petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Seventh Circuit,39 and was later convicted in the
Northern District of Florida of various narcotics charges and escape
from custody.4 ° The convictions were upheld on appeal in the
Eleventh Circuit.4 Following the decision by the Eleventh Circuit,
29 Id.
30 Id. Matta-Ballesteros refused to share his knowledge of the murder because he said
that he feared for his life. Id.
31 Id. Matta-Ballesteros was one of Honduras's leading philanthropists with a great deal
of influence over Honduran officials; Honduras also had a legal prohibition on extraditing
its citizens. See Nadelman, supra note 4, at 871 & nn.263-64 (citing Matta-Ballesteros v.
Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990)); Mark B. Rosenberg,
Narcos and Politicos: The Politics of Drug Trafficking in Honduras, 30J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD
AFF. 143, 149-51 (1988)). The United States also did not follow through on an extradition
effort involving a fourteen-year-old charge of escape from federal authorities. Matta-Ballesteros,
71 F.3d at 761.
32 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 761.




37 Id. Matta-Ballesteros claimed that the stun gun was "applied to various parts of his
body, including his feet and genitals." Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. (citing Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 878 (1990)); see also infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
40 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 761.
41 Id. (citing United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567 (1lth Cir. 1991)); see also infra notes
195-98 and accompanying text.
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Matta-Ballesteros was brought before the Central District of California
to face charges related to the kidnapping and murder of Camarena 2
B. The Central District of California
Matta-Ballesteros was charged, tried, and convicted in the Central
District of California of: "(1) committing, aiding and abetting or
conspiring to commit a violent act in support of an enterprise engaged
in racketeering. .. ; (2) conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent ... ; and
(3) participating in the kidnapping of a federal agent.. ... ," He was
acquitted of charges related to the murder of Camarena itself.4
During the course of his trial, Matta-Ballesteros challenged the
district court's jurisdiction over him, most notably arguing that "the
shocking nature of his abduction and mistreatment require[d]
dismissal."45 Although Matta-Ballesteros brought in photographs,
reports from eyewitnesses, and expert testimony in an attempt to prove
he had been tortured during the trip from Honduras,46 the district
court determined that Matta-Ballesteros had failed to make "a strong
showing of grossly cruel and unusual barbarities."47 Thus, the district
court refused to dismiss the case.48
C. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Matta-Ballesteros appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, where he once again raised jurisdictional
challenges along with several other issues.49 Regarding the jurisdic-
42 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 761-62.
43 Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 It was reported in the Seventh Circuit decision that a physician examining Matta-
Ballesteros "found abrasions on his head, face, scalp, neck, arms, feet, and penis, as well as
blistering on his back." Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 256 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990). The physician testified that "these injuries were consistent with
those which could have been caused by a stun gun." Id.
47 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 764 (citing United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271
(9th Cir. 1975)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975). In reaching this conclusion that Matta-
Ballesteros had not been treated cruelly, the district court also considered the testimony of
two United States Marshals who contradicted the testimony of Matta-Ballesteros. Id. The
district court held that the "[d ] efendant's allegations of mistreatment, even if taken as true,
[did] not constitute such barbarism as to warrant dismissal of the indictment under the
caselaw." Id. (citation omitted).
48 Id.
49 United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.Sd 754 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition to his
jurisdictional challenges, Matta-Ballesteros argued that the district court erred in that: (1) his
conviction was not supported by the evidence, id. at 765, (2) the jury had access to extrane-
ous evidence, id. at 765-66, (3) the district court had made improper evidentiary rulings, id.
at 766-70, and (4) the joint trial with several other codefendants had resulted in prejudice
against him, id. at 770-71. Although these challenges all were rejected by the court of
appeals, id. at 765-71, this Note will focus only on issues surrounding the jurisdictional
challenges.
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tion of the district court to hear his case, Matta-Ballesteros argued that
"extradition treaties between Honduras and the United States
prohibit[ed] his prosecution" and he repeated his argument regarding
the shocking nature of his treatment.5 ° The government countered
that Matta-Ballesteros was collaterally estopped from raising his
jurisdictional challenges because "that issue has already been fully and
fairly litigated as to him in two other federal circuits in cases where he
challenged jurisdiction on the same grounds . ". .."" The Ninth
Circuit reviewed the jurisdictional challenges de novo.52
1. The Majority
The majority opinion, written by Judge Poole, quickly dispensed
with the government's argument that Matta-Ballesteros was collaterally
estopped from raising his jurisdictional challenges in the Ninth
Circuit. 53 After pointing out that the government had cited no
authority to demonstrate that the jurisdictional decisions of the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits should have a preclusive effect in the
Ninth Circuit, the majority stated that only collateral attacks to final
judgments were precluded, not independent jurisdictional challeng-
es. 4 Determining that "[n]one of [the] cases [cited by the govern-
ment] stand for the proposition that there is collateral estoppel effect
as to the litigation of similar jurisdictional issues in unrelated cases,"55
the majority moved on to address Matta-Ballesteros's arguments.
a. The U.S.-Honduras Extradition Treaties
First, the Ninth Circuit addressed Matta-Ballesteros's claim that
extradition treaties between Honduras and the United States precluded
his prosecution. Examining the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain,57 the court noted that although the decision
relied upon by Matta-Ballesteros did hold that international treaties
50 Id. at 762. Matta-Ballesteros relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), to make his argument regarding the extradition
treaties between the United States and Honduras. Matta-Ballesteros 71 F.3d at 762. Matta-
Ballesteros argued that Alvarez-Machain declared treaties to be self-executing, granting
individuals such as himself the right to enforce them. Id.
51 Id. at 762 n.2 (citing United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567 (11th Cir. 1991); Matta-
Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990)).
52 Id. (citing United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1986)).
53 Id. at 762 n.2.
54 Id. The majority noted that all of the cases cited by the government involved
collateral attacks to adverse jurisdictional judgments. Id. (citing Insurance Corp of Ireland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106, 112 (1963); United States v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1991)).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 762.
57 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
[Vol. 21
THE DEMISE OF SUPERVISORY POWERS
bestow rights on individuals, it also held that such rights could be
enforced only where they were stated expressly in the treaty under
consideration. 8 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held, "[w]here the terms of
an extradition treaty do not specifically prohibit the forcible abduction
of foreign nationals, the treaty does not divest federal courts of
jurisdiction over the foreign national." 9
With the holding of Alvarez-Machain in mind, the Ninth Circuit
moved on to analyze the extradition treaties between the United States
and Honduras.60 Upon examining the treaties, the majority found
that "[t]he treaties between the United States and Honduras contain
preservations of rights similar to those which Alvarez-Machain held did
not sufficiently specify extradition as the only way in which one country
may gain custody of a foreign national for purposes of prosecution. "61
Thus, the court held, even though Matta-Ballesteros had been
abducted from Honduras, "[n]othing in the treaties between the
United States and Honduras authorize[d] the dismissal of the
indictment against Matta-Ballesteros."
62
b. Due Process Objections
Once it had determined that the extradition treaties should have
no effect on the court's jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit addressed Matta-
Ballesteros's second jurisdictional challenge involving the allegedly
"shocking nature" in which he was abducted and treated by U.S.
Marshals.6" First, the majority noted that long-standing Supreme
Court precedent, dating from an 1886 decision in Ker v. Illinois and a
1952 decision in Frisbie v. Collins, precluded due process objections to
the manner by which a defendant is brought to trial.' 4 The majority
argued that because the rule in Ker was reaffirmed in Alvarez-Machain,
"attempts to expand due process rights into the realm of foreign
abductions ... have been cut short."6 5
The Ninth Circuit, in applying the "Ker-Frisbie doctrine,"
specifically rejected the reasoning in Toscanino v. United States,66 a
Second Circuit opinion that had fashioned an exception to Ker-Frisbie
58 Matta-Ballestems, 71 F.3d at 762.
59 Id. (citing Alvdrez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 664-66). The Ninth Circuit went on to argue
that Alvarez-Machain thus holds that "in the absence of express prohibitory terms, a treaty's
self-executing nature is illusory." Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. (comparing 504 U.S. at 665-66 with Extradition Treaty, Jan. 15, 1909, U.S.-
Honduras, 37 Stat. 1616, 45 Stat. 2489; Pan American Extradition Treaty, Dec. 26, 1933, arts.
2-4, 21, 49 Stat. 3111).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519,
522 (1952)).
65 Id. at 763 (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974)).
66 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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allowing for dismissal in the event that a due process violation had
occurred prior to trial.67 While the court in Toscanino had relied on
several Supreme Court decisions that it believed supported its
divergence from Ker-Frisbie,68 the Ninth Circuit noted that Supreme
Court cases decided since Toscanino, including Alvarez-Machain, had
"consistently reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine .. 69
c. The Supervisory Powers
Thus rejecting any due process objections to jurisdiction that
could be made along the lines of Toscanino, the Ninth Circuit next
addressed the issue of supervisory powers directly.7" The majority,
citing Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, first established
that
we have inherent supervisory powers to order dismissal of prosecutions
for only three legitimate reasons: (1) to implement a remedy for the
violation of a recognized statutory or constitutional right; (2) to preserve
judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate
considerations validly before a jury; and (3) to deter future illegal
conduct.7
Reviewing the district court's decision not to dismiss for an abuse of
discretion,72 the majority determined that Matta-Ballesteros's abduc-
tion met none of these criteria.7 3
While the majority condemned the actions of the U.S. Marshals,74
it stated that it could find no constitutional or statutory rights that were
67 Matta-Baesteros, 71 F.3d at 763 & n.3. Toscanino also involved an international
abduction. Id. at 763; see also infra note 168 and accompanying text.
68 Id. at 763 & n.3 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,431-432 (1973); Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)). The
majority noted that Toscanino granted dismissal in an exercise of its supervisory powers, id.,
however this appears to have been an alternative holding. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276; see
also infra note 169 and accompanying text.
69 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 763 n.3. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the Supreme
Court has held that "a defendant's body is not a suppressible fruit, and the illegality of a
defendant's detention cannot deprive the government of the opportunity to prove his guilt."
Id. (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
119 (1975)).
70 Id. at 763-65.
71 Id. at 763 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); United States
v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1044
(9th Cir. 1985)).
72 Id. (citing United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 1991)).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 763. The Ninth Circuit noted that:
Although they are members of the Executive Branch, Marshals serve a very special
purpose within the judiciary, because their "primary role and mission [is] to provide
for the security and to obey, execute, and enforce, all orders of the United States
District Courts, the United States Courts of Appeals, and the Court of International
Trade."
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 566(a) (1988)).
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violated by the abduction.75 Furthermore, the court found no illegal
conduct by the Marshals that the court could attempt to deter by
invoking its supervisory powers.76  Thus, relying on a prior Ninth
Circuit decision in United States v. Valot,7 7 the majority held that the
only way it could exercise its supervisory powers to dismiss the case
against Matta-Ballesteros was if the defendant could show governmental
misconduct "of the most shocking and outrageous kind."78
Reviewing the decision of the district court for "clear error" on
this point,79 the majority found that Matta-Ballesteros's allegations of
mistreatment did not "constitute such barbarism as to warrant dismissal
of the indictment under the caselaw."8° The court pointed out that
because Matta-Ballesteros's allegations of torture were disputed by the
testimony of the U.S. Marshals and because his expert testimony was
inconclusive, the district court's finding that he had not been tortured
was reasonable. 8' Thus, the majority held, "much as we may want to
dismiss this case through an exercise of our supervisory powers, to do
so would be unwarranted. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to exercise such powers."82 Retaining jurisdic-
tion, the Ninth Circuit moved on to address the specifics of Matta-
Ballesteros's other appeals.85
2. The Concurrence
Judge Noonan's concurring opinion, focusing on the availability
of the court's supervisory powers, took issue with the majority's
understanding of caselaw and its characterization of Matta-Ballesteros's
abduction.8" The concurrence can be divided into four parts: first,
Judge Noonan differentiated Matta-Ballesteros from the precedent relied
on by the majority;85 second, he argued that international abduction
75 Id. at 763-64. The majority noted that while it "may have a suspicion of Matta-
Ballesteros's inhumane treatment, and the evidence reasonably could support a finding that
he was tortured, it could also support the conclusion of the district court." Id. at 764.
76 Id. at 764. The Ninth Circuit noted that even if it labeled the abduction a
"kidnapping," the Marshals' conduct would not violate constitutional or statutory provisions
in light of Alvare-Machain or international law. Id. at 764 n.5.
77 625 F. 2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980).
78 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 764 (citing Va/ot, 625 F.2d at 310; United States v.
Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1981); Leiterman v. Rushen, 704 F.2d 442, 443 (9th Cir.
1983)).
79 Id. (citing Fielding, 645 F.2d at 724).
80 Id. (citing United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 764-65. The court noted, however, that civil damages might be available to
Matta-Ballesteros. Id. at 765 n.6 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971)).
85 Id. at 765. Matta-Ballesteros's substantive appeals will not be discussed in this Note.
See supra note 49.
84Id. at 772-75 (Noonan, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 772-73 (Noonan, J., concurring).
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was an illegal act; 6 third, Judge Noonan made the case for the Ninth
Circuit's ability to exercise its supervisory powers in situations similar
to Matta-Ballesteros's; 7 and fourth, he argued that the intervening
Eleventh Circuit decision that occurred after Matta-Ballesteros's
abduction prevented the Ninth Circuit from exercising its supervisory
powers in this case.8
a. Setting the Case Apart
Judge Noonan-by limiting the cases to their facts-differentiated
the precedent relied on by the majority from the facts of Matta-
Ballesteros.89 First, the concurrence argued that Ker v. Illinois was not
controlling because that case "involve[d] the kidnapping by a private
citizen of a defendant residing in a foreign country and wanted for an
offense against the statute of a particular state ... "90 The concur-
rence next argued that Frisbie v. Collins should not control because it
involved "the kidnapping of a defendant from one state of the United
States by police officers of another one of the states. .. ."' Then the
concurrence said United States v. Alvarez Machain should not control
because that case "turn [ed] on the alleged violation of a treaty between
the United States and the foreign country from which the defendant
was removed . -." Judge Noonan then argued that the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman should not control
because Matta-Ballesteros's case did not "turn on the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the abducted defendant."93 Finally, the concurrence
argued, United States v. Toscanino should not control because that case
"turn[ed] on the due process rights of the abducted defen-
dant .... ,,9" Thus, Judge Noonan wrote, "[t]his case is not to be
decided by stray dicta from the above cases; for what a court does not
have before it a court does not authoritatively address."95
b. International Abduction Equals Illegal Kidnapping
After clearly labeling Matta-Ballesteros's abduction as a kidnap-
ping, Judge Noonan explored domestic and international law in an
86 Id. at 773-74 (Noonan, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 774-75 (Noonan, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 775 (Noonan, J., concurring)
89 Id. at 772-73 (Noonan, J., concurring).
90 Id. at 772 (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing Ker, 199 U.S. at 436) (emphasis added).
91 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 72) (emphasis added).
92 Id. (Noonan,J., concurring) (citing Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655). Judge Noonan
also argued that Alvarez-Machain should not control because that case involved an "alleged
violation of international customary law." Id.
93 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d at 262).
94 Id. (Noonan,J., concurring) (citing Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267; Lujan v. Gengler, 510
F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)).
95 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring).
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effort to demonstrate that the U.S. Marshals' actions were illegal and
that they should not be condoned by the court in any way. 6 Judge
Noonan cited one Ninth Circuit case indicating that "[k]idnapping
committed in a foreign country becomes an offense against federal law
when the victim is transported by the kidnappers into the United
States" and that "[t]he kidnapping continues as long as the victim is
not released by the abductors."97 He also pointed to Article 9 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations Security
Council Resolution 579,9" both of which he said indicated internation-
al condemnation of kidnapping.99 Judge Noonan continued that the
motive of the kidnappers was irrelevant, arguing that the fact that the
abductors were U.S. law enforcement officers in this case only "doubles
the horror of their activities."100 Concluding his scrutiny of the
abduction, Judge Noonan noted that "[w] e are then confronted with
a kidnapping, and we as judges are asked to be part of the kidnapping
.... The federal courts are inextricably tied to the kidnapping because
federal trial was the reason for abducting him."9
0 1
c. The Ninth Circuit's Supervisory Powers
Rather than become a party to illegal actions, such as kidnapping,
Judge Noonan argued that the federal courts have the option to
dismiss prosecutions in order to deter such actions.' Citing the
Supreme Court decision in McNabb v. United States,103 the concur-
rence pointed out that such an exercise of supervisory powers does not
96 Id. at 773-74 (Noonan,J., concurring). Before exploring various statutes and treaties,
Judge Noonan contributed his own opinions of kidnapping. Id. at 773 (Noonan, J. concur-
ring). Judge Noonan noted that, although the manner in which Matta-Ballesteros was treated
after the abduction was disputed, that dispute was not altogether important because
[k] idnapping in itself is a violent attack upon a human person--a sudden invasion
of personal security, a brutal deprivation of personal liberty. Kidnapping in itself
is a cruel act, and the cruelty is magnified when the victim's home is the place
where the violent assault upon his liberty is made.
Id. (Noonan, J., concurring).
97 Id. (Noonan,J., concurring) (citing United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 343 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
98 Id. (Noonan,J., concurring); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res.
217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948); S.C. Res. 579 U.N. SCOR, at
24, U.N. Doc. S/INF/41 (1985).
99 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 773 (Noonan, J., concurring).
100 Id. (Noonan,J., concurring). Judge Noonan wrote that "[i]f agents of the mightiest
power on earth are unrestrained from kidnapping by legal authority. .. the freedom of
individuals throughout the world is at the mercy of a decision made by an official of the
United States Department of Justice." Id. (Noonan, J. concurring).
101 Id. at 774 (Noonan, J., concurring).
102 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505
(1983)).
103 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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have to be linked to any constitutional or statutory violation. °4
Further, Judge Noonan noted, none of the cases relied on by the
majority addressed the supervisory powers issue directly.' °5 Rather,
he argued, the Ninth Circuit precedent relied on by the majority were
due process cases or were distinguishable on their facts.'0 6 Thus,
Judge Noonan wrote, "[n] o precedent stands in the way of [the Ninth
Circuit's] use of supervisory powers here.' 0 7
d. The Problem of the Intervening Decision
Although it appeared that all roadblocks to an exercise of the
Ninth Circuit's supervisory powers had been removed by the concur-
rence's opinion, Judge Noonan noted that this was not quite the
case.' s In an argument that took two paragraphs and cited no
supporting authority, the concurrence said that one insurmountable
hurdle prevented the Ninth Circuit from being able to dismiss the
case: "[a] decision of another federal court has broken the confine-
ment caused by the abduction."0 9 Because Matta-Ballesteros had not
raised the issue of supervisory powers in the Eleventh Circuit case in
which he was convicted of various narcotics charges and escape, Judge
Noonan argued that he had waived this argument altogether."0
Thus, he concluded, Matta-Ballesteros "stands before [the Ninth
Circuit] not as the victim of an abduction (which he once was) but as
a lawfully-held prisoner. Accordingly, we need not dismiss the case.""'
104 Matta-Ballsteos, 71 F.3d at 774-75 (Noonan,J., concurring) (citing McNabb, 318 U.S.
at 340).
105 Id. at 775 (Noonan,J., concurring).
106 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.
1980) (utilizing a Toscanino due process argument); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719
(9th Cir. 1981) (involving no showing of U.S. involvement in an abduction); United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1974) (utilizing a due process argument and not
involving direct U.S. participation in an abduction)).
107 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring). Judge Noonan, after dispensing with the authority
utilized by the majority, argued that although the court could only exercise supervisory
powers over its own business and only for a recognized purpose, id. (Noonan,J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991)), the Ninth Circuit
would be doing just that by dismissing the case against Matta-Ballesteros in order to deter
illegal conduct by U.S. Marshals. Id. (Noonan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The
concurrence argued: "[w] hen an agency whose primary mission is to obey our orders, and
whose functions do not include overseas abductions, undertakes to kidnap from abroad a
person for production in trial in a federal court, this action becomes our business." Id.
(Noonan, J., concurring).
108 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring).
109 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring).
110 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567 (11th Cir.
1991)).
11 Id. (NoonanJ., concurring).
1996] THE DEMISE OF SUPERVISORY POWERS
III. Background Law
A. The History of Supervisory Powers
The supervisory powers of the federal courts were established in
the 1943 decision of the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States."'
Decided at a time when the Court's interest in protecting the integrity
of the judiciary may have been at an all-time high,"' the McNabb
decision appeared to address many of Justice Brandeis's concerns that
had been uttered in several previous dissenting opinions.' 14 Justice
Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States"5 is perhaps the one
most often quoted as setting the stage for the McNabb decision." 6
Arguing that the end should not justify the means when criminal
conduct on the part of law enforcement officers is involved," 7 justice
Brandeis said the courts should deny their assistance to such officers
in order to maintain the purity of the judiciary."8
Justice Brandeis's view was accepted by the majority of the
Supreme Court in McNabb, a case involving the prolonged detention
and multiple interrogations of three suspects accused of murdering a
federal agent."9  After police had questioned the suspects-both
individually and separately-for many hours over the course of three
days, the government attempted to use their admissions against them
112 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
113 See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1439-45 (1984).
Disturbing law enforcement practices, such as prolonged interrogations, wiretappings and
entrapments had recently been brought to the attention of the courts. Id. at 1441-44. In
addition, McNabb was decided shortly after the Supreme Court began adopting and enforcing
rules of evidence, criminal procedure, and civil procedure. Id. at 1444-45.
114 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
115 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1537 (1990) (quoting Olmstead,
277 U.S. 438 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
7 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
118 Beale, supra note 113, at 1443 (citing Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
119 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 334-38 (1943).
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in federal court. 2° The admissions, which were "the crux of the
Government's case," 2 ' had been elicited without having a lawyer
present and without taking the suspects before a magistrate.
12
The defendants attempted to have their admissions excluded on
Constitutional grounds, but the Supreme Court held that it was
unnecessary for the Court to reach the Constitutional issue in order to
keep out the admissions: "[T]he scope of our reviewing power over
convictions brought here from the federal courts is not confined to
ascertainment of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty
of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence. 12  Thus, the Court held, because "[t]he principles
governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal trials ha [d]
not been restricted ... to those derived solely from the Constitu-
tion,"2 4 it could keep out the admissions simply due to the miscon-
duct of the officers involved.
125
While the McNabb case involved an exercise of the Court's
supervisory powers to exclude evidence obtained in connection with an
illegal act committed by law enforcement officers, the federal courts
also have exercised their supervisory powers to ensure that correct
procedures are used by the courts themselves.' 26  Ballard v. United
States,117 involving the Court's dismissal of a case in which women
had been intentionally excluded from the jury pool, 28 was one such
case. Although Congress had not specifically mandated that women be
permitted to serve on juries,'29 the Ballard Court determined that
because juries were intended to be "a cross-section of the community"
and because women were eligible to serve on juries in the state
involved:'S
We conclude that the purposeful and systematic exclusion of women from
120 Id. The type of interrogations utilized by the police in McNabb commonly was known
as "the third degree." See Beale, supra note 113, at 1442.
121 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 338.
122 Id. at 336.
123 Id. at 340.
124 Id. at 341. The Court also noted that authority to formulate rules of evidence "not
limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance" had existed "from the very beginning
of its history." Id.
123 Id. at 341-42. The Court pointed out that by failing to promptly bring the suspects
before a committing authority, such as a magistrate, the officers likely had broken federal and
state laws. Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
126 See Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integnity: A Call for its Re-Emergence in the Adjudication of
Criminal Cases, 84J. CRIM. L. 462, 471 & n.62 (1993) (citing United States v. Williams, 504
U.S. 36 (1992); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); Ballard v. United
States; 329 U.S. 187 (1946)).
127 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
128 Id. at 189-90.
129 Id. at 191.
130 Id.
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* the panel in this case was a departure from the scheme ofjury selection
which Congress adopted and that ... we should exercise our power...
over the administration of justice in the federal courts ... to correct an
error which permeated this proceeding.'
3
'
In deciding to dismiss the case, the Court indicated in Ballard that it
had exercised its supervisory powers, not only to protect the rights of
the individual defendant, but to protect "the democratic ideal reflected
in the processes of our courts."132
Although the federal courts have used their supervisory powers
multiple times since the early Supreme Court cases, 3 the recent
trend has been toward restricting the use of the supervisory pow-
ers. 3 4  In United States v. Payner, ' for example, the Court an-
nounced that the supervisory powers could not be utilized to make an
end-run around Constitutional limitations, especially where the result
would mean suppressing reliable evidence. 36  Thus, where the
defendant did not have standing to assert the Fourth Amendment
rights of a third party in order to exclude some incriminating
documents, 3 7 the Court held that it would not be proper for the
Court to use its supervisory powers to circumvent the standing
limitation.38
United States v. Hastin 3 9 appeared to join the trend away from
a liberal exercise of supervisory powers. In that case, which-in the
same vein as Ballard-involved a challenge to a procedural error in a
lower court,"4 the Court held that the supervisory powers should not
be exercised to correct "harmless error.' 4' After determining that a
prosecutor's error-which possibly had impinged upon the respon-
dent's Fifth Amendment rights-could not have changed the outcome
of the trial, the Supreme Court reasoned that "the goals that are
131 Id. at 193 (citing Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)).
132 Id. at 195.
133 See Bloom, supra note 126, at 474 n.76 (citing more than twenty-five federal court
decisions in which the supervisory powers have been utilized).
134 See Bloom, supra note 126, at 474-77 (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36
(1992); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); United State v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727 (1980)).
135 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
136 See id. at 734-35.
137 Id. at 731-32. The documents, which incriminated the defendant, had been taken
from a briefcase of the defendant's banker and photocopied without the banker's permission.
Id. at 730. The district court found that the United States, acting through a private
investigator, had "knowingly and willfully participated in the unlawful seizure of [the
banker's] briefcase ...." Id. (citation omitted).
138 Id. at 735.
139 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
140 Id. at 503. The respondents complained that the prosecutor, by commenting to the
jury on the fact that the respondents had not testified, had violated their Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. Id.
'1 Id. at 506.
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implicated by supervisory powers are not ... significant in the context
of this case ....142 This was true, the Court held, even if the intent
of reversing the case was to deter improper conduct by the prosecutors
in the future. 4
Although Hasting did appear to narrow the supervisory powers, it
also indicated that such powers still were available to the federal
courts.' The Court noted that "in the exercise of supervisory
powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules
not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress."'45 In
addition, the Court cited three specific instances in which the
supervisory powers may be exercised: "[T]o implement a remedy for
violation of recognized rights ... ; to preserve judicial integrity by
ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly
before the jury... ; and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal
conduct." 1
46
The restrictions on supervisory powers imposed by Hasting were
echoed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when it decided
United States v. Simpson.'4 The Ninth Circuit, which had exercised
its supervisory powers on numerous occasions in the past,'" declined
to exercise its supervisory powers in Simpson to allow the dismissal of
an indictment where the district court judge merely disapproved of the
government's investigatory tactics.149  Noting that the district court
had not found that an illegal act had been committed by government
142 Id. The Court argued that one purpose of the supervisory powers-protecting the
integrity of the judicial process-carried less weight in the event of harmless error because
"it is the essence of the harmless error doctrine that ajudgment may stand only when there
is no 'reasonable possibility that the [practice] complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87
(1963)).
143 Id. The Court noted that "means more narrowly tailored to deter objectionable
prosecutorial conduct," such as disciplinary proceedings by the Department of Justice, are
available. Id. at 506 & n.5.
144 Id. at 505.
145 Id.
146 Id. (citations omitted).
147 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (1990).
148 See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 781 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated and
remanded, 464 U.S. 806 (1983); Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.), aff'd
on rehg, 483 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1973); Guam v. Camacho, 470 F.2d 919,920 (9th Cir. 1972).
Although vacated in light of Hasting, the court's decision in Gonsalves had set a high water
mark for the ability of the Ninth Circuit to exercise its supervisory powers in order "to do
justice in particular fact situations that do not lend themselves to rules of general
application." Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1316 (1982). This rather broad standard for utilizing
the supervisory powers was subsequently discarded in favor of the three limited situations
specified by Hasting. See Simpson, 927 F.2d at 1090; see also supra text accompanying note 146.
149 Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088. In Simpson, the FBI paid a prostitute and heroin user to
convince the defendant to sell heroin to an undercover agent. Id. at 1089. The process of
"convincing" the defendant included becoming romantically involved with him. Id. In
addition, the prostitute engaged in several criminal activities while she was on the federal
payroll, including heroin use and shoplifting. Id.
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agents themselves during the course of the investigation, the Ninth
Circuit held that "[u]nless the law enforcement officers break the law,
the court has no authority to sanction them."5 ° Thus, the court
reasoned, the first instance in which supervisory powers may be
exercised, "to implement a remedy for the violation of a recognized
statutory or constitutional right," did not exist in this case.'5 '
The Ninth Circuit also found that the second instance in which
supervisory powers may be utilized, "to preserve judicial integrity by
ensuring that [a conviction] rests on appropriate considerations validly
before" a jury, also did not exist in the Simpson case.'5 The court
noted that "[t]he supervisory power comprehends authority for the
courts to supervise their own affairs, not the affairs of the other
branches .... ,153 Determining that the out-of-courtroom conduct
in this case was the business of the executive branch and not of the
judiciary, the Ninth Circuit held that dismissal would be improper.' 54
In addition, the Simpson court concluded, although "[t]he supervisory
power may also be used to deter future illegal conduct," there was no
illegal conduct of the government that could be deterred in this
case. 1
5
B. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and Due Process Rights
1. The Origins
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine, often cited for the proposition that the
manner in which a defendant is brought to trial should not preclude
jurisdiction,"' is an outgrowth of the Supreme Court's 1886 decision
in Ker v. Illinois.17 In Ker, the defendant was abducted from Lima,
Peru, and taken to the United States by Henry Julian, a private
"messenger" appointed by the President to seek the defendant's
extradition.5 8 Although Julian had the necessary papers to secure
the extradition of the defendant, he did not do so.5 9  Instead, he
"forcibly and violently arrested" the defendant, placed him on a U.S.
ship, and transported him to San Francisco." When the Court
addressed the issue of the defendant's abduction, it held that the
150 Id. at 1090.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1090-91 (quotations omitted).
'53 Id. at 1091.
'54 Id. at 1091.
155 Id. Although the prostitute had indeed engaged in illegal conduct, the Ninth Circuit
held that her conduct could not be attributed to the government. Id.
156 See Bush, supra note 11, at 945.
157 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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manner in which the defendant was brought to trial did not infringe
upon his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.161 In addition,
the Court held that the defendant was not entitled to asylum in Peru
by virtue of a treaty between that country and the United States.'62
The rule announced in Ker was reaffirmed in 1952 by Frisbie v.
Collins.'63 In Frisbie, a habeas corpus case, the defendant was living
in Chicago when Michigan police "forcibly seized, handcuffed, black-
jacked and took him to Michigan." 1"' Although the defendant
sought his release from Michigan state prison on the assertion that the
nature of his abduction violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Kidnapping Act, the Supreme
Court denied his claim. 6 5 Noting that the Federal Kidnapping Act
did not expressly prohibit a state from prosecuting persons "wrongfully
brought to it by its officers," the Court held that the rule in Ker
remained intact.
2. The Exception
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit parted
ways with the long-standing Ker-Frisbie doctrine when it decided United
States v. Toscanino.167 Relying on a series of Supreme Court cases that
had expanded Fourth Amendment and due process rights since the
decision in Frisbie,"6a the Second Circuit held that abducting a
defendant overseas and forcibly bringing him before a court violated
the Fourth Amendment and international laws, especially where torture
was involved. 69 Thus, the Court fashioned an exception to the Ker-
161 Id. at 440. The Court noted that as long as the defendant was "regularly indicted by
the proper grand jury in the [s] tate court, has a trial according to the forms and modes
prescribed for such trials, and.., in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights
to which he is lawfully entitled," due process has been met. Id.
162 Id. at 442.
163 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
16 Id. at 520.
165 Id. at 523.
166 Id. at 522-23.
167 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
168 Id at 272-73 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961)). Although Rochin was decided two months prior to the Court's decision in Frisbie,
id. at 273, the Second Circuit argued that the Rochin decision merely anticipated the later
erosion of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Id.
169 Id. at 276. In Toscanino, the defendant, an Italian citizen, was abducted from his
home in Montevideo, Uruguay, by a paid agent of the United States. Id. at 269. He allegedly
was interrogated and tortured for three weeks in Brazil before he was transported to the
United States. Id. The court stated:
[W] hen an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction, the
court's acquisition of power over his person represents the fruits of the govern-
ment's exploitation of its own misconduct. Having unlawfully seized the defendant
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees "the right of the people
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Frisbie doctrine, calling for a court "to divest itself of jurisdiction over
the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of
the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion
of the accused's constitutional rights."'7 0
Because the Toscanino court had relied heavily on the Supreme
Court decisions in Rochin v. Calfornia'7' and United States v. Rus-
sell 72 to reach its conclusion, Toscanino has been interpreted as
espousing a "shocks the conscience" test, defined by Rochin, and an
illegal law enforcement test, defined by RusselL17' However, the
Second Circuit soon limited Toscanino to the "shocks the conscience"
test alone. 74 In Lujan v. Gengler,175 the Second Circuit-faced with
yet another international abduction-determined that this particular
abduction did not rise to the "shocks the conscience" level defined by
Rochin and echoed by Toscanino.'76  In so doing, the court also
seemed to indicate that illegal conduct on the part of law enforcement
officers alone may not be enough to warrant a dismissal.
77
The Fourth Amendment exception Toscanino and Lujan have
applied to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has been recognized by the Ninth
Circuit. 178  However, in United States v. Valot,179 the Ninth Circuit
indicated that such an exception will allow for dismissal of cases "only
where the defendant alleges governmental conduct 'of the most
shocking and outrageous kind.""8  Similarly, in United States v.
Lovato,'8 ' the Ninth Circuit required the defendant to make a "strong
to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures," the
government should as a matter of fundamental fairness be obligated to return him
to his status quo ante.
Id. at 275.
170 Id. at 275. The Second Circuit alternatively held that since Ker and Frisbie involved
convictions in state courts, those holdings might not govern the defendant's case, which
involved an appeal from a federal district court. Id. at 276. In addition, the Toscanino court
reasoned that its supervisory powers might be exercised to achieve the same result. Id.
171 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
172 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
173 See Timothy D. Rudy, Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbie? 26 ST. MARY'S L. J. 791, 807-08
& nn.105-06 (1995) (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172; Russell 411 U.S. at 435).
174 See Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975);
Rudy, supra note 173, at 808.
175 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
176 Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67. Although the defendant in Lujan alleged that he had been
arrested and held-without being charged-by police in Bolivia before he was brought to the
United States by federal agents, he did not allege any torture. Id. at 63.
177 Id. at 66-68. The Second Circuit also made much of the fact that, although the
defendant alleged that international law had been violated in the course of his abduction,
there had been no official protests by the countries involved. Id. at 67.
178 See United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fielding, 645
F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975).
179 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980).
180 Id. at 309-10.
181 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975). Although the defendant in Lovato had sought an
exercise of the Ninth Circuit's supervisory powers, he relied on Toscanino to support his
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showing of grossly cruel and unusual barbarities inflicted upon him by
persons who can be characterized as paid agents of the United
States."182 Thus, where the defendant in Valot alleged that he had
been illegally abducted from Thailand but did not allege any further
mistreatment,' the Ninth Circuit held that the Toscanino/Lujan
exception was unavailable.8 4 And where the defendant in Lovato
alleged only that Mexican Army personnel, acting as U.S. agents, had
engaged in misconduct by delivering him to U.S. officers at the border,
the Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss the case against him.'85
The Ninth Circuit also refused to apply the Toscanino/Lujan
exception in United States v. Fielding.8' Although the defendant had
alleged both an abduction and torture in that case, he was unable to
demonstrate a link between his mistreatment by Peruvian officials and
federal agents.8 7 The Ninth Circuit held that such a link was
required in order for the exception to apply.'
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, both of which presided over
cases in which Matta-Ballesteros was a party, have rejected the
Toscanino/Lujan exception.'89 Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman9° was the
first time in which the Seventh Circuit had squarely faced the issue of
whether to adopt the Toscanino/Lujan exception.' 91 Although Matta-
Ballesteros, in seeking habeas relief, argued that the Seventh Circuit
should apply the exception to dismiss the charges against him, the
Seventh Circuit declined to do so and rejected the Toscanino/Lujan
exception outright in the process.' 92 In rejecting the exception, the
Seventh Circuit argued that Toscanino "is of ambiguous constitutional
origins,"193 and relied on Supreme Court cases reaffirming the Ker-
argument for dismissal. Id. at 1271. Thus, the Ninth Circuit focused on the Toscanino/Lujan
exception and neglected to discuss whether its supervisory powers should be exercised in the
case. Id.
182 Id. at 1271.
183 Valor, 625 F.2d at 309.
184 Id. at 309-10. Valot's claim that an extradition treaty between the United States and
Thailand was also dismissed by the court due to the participation of the Thai government in
his removal to the United States. Id. at 310
185 Lovato, 520 F.2d at 1271.
186 645 F. 2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981).
187 Id. at 723-24. The district court had determined that although the defendant's
treatment in a Peruvian jail was outrageous, "there is no showing whatsoever that the United
States participated in any of the conduct . I..." d.
188 Id.
189 See Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
878 (1990); United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567 (11th Cir. 1991).
190 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990).
191 Id. at 261.
192 Id. at 263.
193 Id. at 261. The court stated: "On its face, Toscanino purports to rely on the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause (of either the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment). Yet the
Second Circuit relied for support on Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), a Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule case." Id.
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Frisbie doctrine. 94
The Eleventh Circuit had already rejected the Toscanino/Lujan
exception by the time it heard United States v. Matta.'95  Thus, the
court made quick work of Matta-Ballesteros's appeal involving various
narcotics and escape convictions that had been handed down in
district court.'96 The Eleventh Circuit merely referred to its decision
in United States v. Darby197 and the reasoning of the 'Seventh Circuit
in Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman as it refused to reverse the district court's
convictions. 198
C. Treaties and Their Effect on International Abductions
1. United States v. Alvarez-Machain
While a past Supreme Court decision, in dicta, had indicated that
the presence of an extradition treaty might operate as a possible
second exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine preventing international
abductions,'99 the Supreme Court put this notion to rest in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain.2 °  In that case, Dr. Alvarez Machain was
kidnapped from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico, and flown
by private plane to El Paso, Texas."' Once there, he was arrested by
DEA agents on charges that he had participated-with Matta-
Ballesteros-in the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena °
Although the district court and Ninth Circuit both held that they
lacked jurisdiction to try the defendant because his abduction had
violated an extradition treaty with Mexico, °3 the Supreme Court
determined that because the treaty had not specified extradition as the
only means by which a country might gain custody of an individual,
international abduction did not violate the treaty.204 Thus, the Court
194 Id. at 262-63.
195 937 F.2d 567 (llth Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1530-31
(11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the exception).
196 United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567 (11th. Cir. 1991).
197 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984).
198 United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d at 567-68. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that
"[e]ven were we to recognize such an exception, Matta's allegations of misconduct simply do
not rise to the level of 'brutal torture and incessant interrogation' alleged in the Second
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Toscanino." Id. at 568 (citing Toscanino, 500 F.2d at
267).
199 See Rudy, supra note 173, at 811 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259 (1990)).
200 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
201 Id. at 657.
202 Id. The district court determined that while DEA agents were not personally involved
in the abduction of Alvarez-Machain, they were responsible for it. Id.
203 Id. at 658.
204 Id. at 664-65. Although the Court determined that an express violation of the treaty
would have prevented it from finding jurisdiction, id. at 659-60, the Court found no such
violation. Id. at 666. In addition, the Court held that no implied term should be read into
the treaty prohibiting prosecution where the defendant's presence is obtained by means other
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held, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine still applied, and the fact that Alvarez-
Machain had been abducted did not function to rob the courts of their
jurisdiction over him.20 5
2. The United States-Honduras Extradition Treaties
Two treaties affect extradition between the United States and
Honduras. The first treaty, signed by Honduras and the United States
in 1909 and amended in 1927,206 provided for the extradition of
"fugitives of justice" for any one of a list of enumerated crimes,
including murder and "crimes against the laws for the suppression of
the traffic in narcotic products."2 7  The U.S.-Honduras Treaty also
contained a provision mandating that, despite its provisions for
extradition, "neither of the Contracting Parties shall be bound to
deliver up its own citizens." 20 ' No mention was made in the U.S.-
Honduras Treaty regarding international abduction as a method of
obtaining jurisdiction over a fugitive.
The second treaty, signed in 1933 by the United States and
numerous other countries, including Honduras, at the Conference of
American States, also provided for the extradition of fugitives in a
limited number of circumstances. 2 9 Like the U.S.-Honduras Treaty,
the Pan American Treaty contained a provision allowing a country to
refuse extradition of its own citizens,210 and no mention of interna-
tional abduction for jurisdictional purposes was made.
D. The World View of International Abduction
than those established by the treaty. Id. at 667-69. The relevant portion of the treaty stated:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the
executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that
Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper
to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph I of this Article, the
requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.
Id. at 663 (citing Extradition Treaty, May 4,1978, U.S.-United Mexican States, 31 U.S.T. 5059,
5065, T.I.A.S. No. 9656).
205 Id. The Court noted that "the Mexican government was made aware, as early as
1906, of the Ker doctrine, and the United States position that it applied to forcible
abductions made outside of the terms of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty." Id.
at 665. In addition, the Court noted that an official protest that had been made by the
Mexican government would be better addressed by executive branch action than by the
courts. Id. at 669-70 & n.16.
206 Extradition Treaty, Jan. 15, 1909, U.S.-Honduras, 37 Stat. 1616, 45 Stat. 2489
[hereinafter U.S.-Honduras Treaty].
207 U.S.-Honduras Treaty, supra note 206, art. 11 (21).
208 U.S.-Honduras Treaty, supra note 206, art. VIII.
209 Pan American Extradition Treaty, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 2-4, 21, 49 Stat. 3111 [hereinaf-
ter Pan American Treaty].
210 Pan American Treaty, supra note 209, art. 2.
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1. International Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations (Declaration) in 1948, was
intended to "promote friendly relations between nations" and to
recognize "the inherent dignity" and "inalienable rights" of all
people.2 12 Although the Declaration was non-binding when it was
originally passed and represented only the goal for "a common
standard of achievement for all ... Nations,"213 much of the Declara-
tion has been adopted by the United States in a binding treaty known
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
1 4
Several articles of the Declaration might be construed as affecting
international abduction. Article 9 of the Declaration provides that "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." 215 In
addition, Article 3 specifies that "[e]veryone has the right to life,
liberty, and the security of person."216 Finally, Article 12 provides
that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honour or reputation. "217
The United Nations Security Council has also adopted a resolution
that might have some bearing on international abduction. Adopted
unanimously in 1985 to promote "friendly relations and co-operation
among States," Security Council Resolution 579 (Resolution) included
abduction in a list of actions it condemned as acts of terrorism.1 8
The Resolution equated abduction with hostage-taking, and called for
"the immediate safe release of all hostages and abducted persons
wherever and by whomever they are being held."219 In addition, the
Resolution affirmed "the obligation of all States in whose territory
hostages or abducted persons are held urgently to take all appropriate
measures to secure their safe release and to prevent the commission
211 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948).
212 Id. pmbl.
213 Id.
214 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1967) [hereinafter Covenant]. The Covenant entered into force for the United States on
September 8, 1992. See Rudy, supra note 173, at 792 n.4. Timothy Rudy, Assistant Legal
Counsel to the House Democratic Caucus, argued that the Covenant-if it is determined by
U.S. courts to be self-executing-may have "treatied away' the Ker-Frisbie doctrine due to its
possible prohibition of abductions. Id. at 817-39.
215 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 211, art. 9.
216 Id. at art. 3.
217 Id. at art. 12.
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of acts of hostage-taking and abduction in the future."220
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue
of international abduction in the context of federal kidnapping
statutes.22' In United States v. Garcia,222 the defendants--a married
couple-abducted two sisters who were visiting a carnival in Tijuana,
Mexico, and transported them into the United States.2 3 The sisters
were beaten, sexually assaulted, and held captive for several years.224
When the defendants were put on trial for the kidnapping, they
attempted to argue that the kidnapping ended at the time the sisters
were first abducted and transported into California and that the statute
of limitations had expired. 25  However, the Ninth Circuit held that
the crime of kidnapping is a continuing offense that lasts until the
victim is released. 26 In addition, although the abduction itself had
occurred in Mexico, the court held that-because the defendants had
transported the sisters across an international boundary and into the
United States-the kidnapping violated federal law. 7
IV. Significance of United States v. Matta-Ballesteros
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Matta-Ballesteros, while not quite
sealing the coffin of the federal courts' supervisory powers, could signal
their imminent demise if the case withstands further review. However,
before the fallout from Matta-Ballesteros can be exactly resolved, it must
first be determined what message the Ninth Circuit intended to send
regarding their supervisory powers. Because the majority appeared to
have difficulty separating the issue of supervisory powers from that of
due process concerns, deciphering the message of Matta-Ballesteros may
not be a simple task.
A. The Majority's Examination of the Treaty and Due Process Claims
The majority did have support for its decision to reject Matta-
220 ld.
221 United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1988).
222 854 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1988).
223 Id. at 341.
224 Id. at 341-43.
225 Id. at 343.
226 Id. at 344 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1994)).
227 Id. The pertinent portion of the statute states:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries
away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case
of a minor by the parent thereof, when.., the person is willfully transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.., shall be punished by imprisonment for any term
of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1994).
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Ballesteros's appeal based on the U.S.-Honduras extradition treaty,""
especially in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Alvarez-Machain.29  If an extradition treaty does not specifically
prohibit forcible abductions as an alternative to extradition, and if the
treaty does not require a court to refuse jurisdiction in the event such
an abduction has occurred, Alvarez-Machain mandates that the treaty
may not be used to avoid a finding of jurisdiction 30
As the Ninth Circuit noted,2"' an examination of the extradition
treaties between the United States and Honduras reveals a high degree
of similarity with the Mexican extradition treaty discussed in Alvarez-
Machain.3 All three treaties contain passages discussing extradition
provisions, including reservations concerning the extradition of
citizens, yet none of the treaties expressly prohibits abduction as an
alternative to extradition.3 Thus, despite the fact that the decision
in Alvarez-Machain resulted in widespread international condemna-
tion,2"4 the Ninth Circuit had little choice but to conclude that the
extradition treaties between the United States and Honduras could not
be used to prevent a finding of jurisdiction.
The majority's application of the Ker-Frisbie rule to reject Matta-
Ballesteros's Toscanino/Lujan due process appeal also appeared to be
on the mark in light of Alvarez-Machain.3 The Alvarez-Machain
decision based much of its reasoning on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,"6
and although the Court never addressed the Toscanino/Lujan
exception expressly, its reaffirmation of the doctrine as applied to an
international abduction has been interpreted as an implicit rejection
228 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
229 504 U.S. 655 (1992); see supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
230 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 664-65; see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
232 Compare text of treaty supra note 204 with text of U.S.-Honduras and Pan-American
Treaties supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
233 See supra note 204; text accompanying notes 206-10.
234 See supra note 11. Some critics likened the decision in Alvarez-Machain to practices
of terrorist states like Libya and Iran. Bush, supra note 11 at 941 & n.12. Even China, not
noted for being a champion of human rights, blasted the decision. Id. at 942 & n.15.
235 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. Although the majority indicated that
Toscanino involved an exercise of the court's supervisory powers, Matta-Baesteros, 71 F.3d at
763 & n.3; see supra note 68, this may have been a mischaracterization of the decision.
Toscanino primarily based dismissal of jurisdiction on due process and Fourth Amendment
concerns. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272-76; see supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. The
Second Circuit's discussion in Toscanino of whether it might exercise its supervisory powers
to achieve the same result appeared to be only an alternative holding or dicta. See Toscanino,
500 F.2d at 276.
236 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. By referring to the Mexican government's
knowledge of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the Court seemed to imply that if the Mexican
government had wished to avoid an application of the doctrine to allow for abduction of its
citizens, it should have worded its extradition treaty accordingly (i.e., expressly forbidding
abductions as an alternative to extradition). See id.
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of Toscanino.23 7
Although arguably predictable in response to the Alvarez-Machain
decision, the majority's outright rejection of the Toscanino/Lujan
exception in Matta-Ballesteros is significant. The Ninth Circuit
previously had left the door open to the possibility that, in the event
government agents were found responsible for conduct "of the most
shocking and outrageous kind,""8 it might be willing to utilize the
Toscanino/Lujan exception to grant a dismissal. 39 However, in Matta-
Ballesteros, the Ninth Circuit indicated it no longer considered
Toscanino to be good law. 4° Thus, this exception to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine likely will no longer be available to courts in the Ninth
Circuit, even where there is a "strong showing of grossly cruel and
unusual barbarities" committed by federal agents.
241
B. The Supervisory Powers: Majority vs. Concurrence
Although the majority adequately supported its decision not to
dismiss jurisdiction on either the treaty or due process grounds, its
support became shaky as the majority addressed the issue of its
supervisory powers.2 42  In what should have been a discussion of a
wholly separate ground for granting dismissal, the majority fell back on
its reasoning for rejecting Matta-Ballesteros's other arguments. This
may be where the concurrence's disagreement with the majority was
the most compelling.
While the majority accurately cited United States v. Hasting43 and
United States v. Simpson'" as cases defining the limits of the federal
courts' supervisory powers,2 45 its reasoning lost strength as it moved
on to explore those limits. For example, the majority's determination
that no constitutional or statutory rights were violated by Matta-
Ballesteros's abduction may not be as clear cut as the majority
indicated.246 Even though courts, applying the reasoning of United
237 See Rudy, supra note 173, at 814. Rudy argues that the Ker-Frisbie rule likely will
withstand all attacks, whether prudential or constitutional, unless advocates "can fashion an
argument based on binding international law." Id.
238 United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1980)
239 See United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lovato, 520
F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975); supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
240 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 763. The Ninth Circuit noted that "[i]n the shadow cast
by Alvarez-Machai, attempts to expand due process rights into the realm of foreign
abductions, as the Second Circuit did in United States v. Toscanino... have been cut short."
I&
241 Lovato, 520 F.2d at 1271.
242 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 763. See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
243 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
244 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1991).
245 Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 763-64; see supra notes 71, 139-55 and accompanying text.
246 Id. at 763-64; see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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States v. Garcia,247 would be reluctant to label abductions by federal
agents as illegal kidnappings,248 there is still the question of interna-
tional law.
As the concurrence noted, both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Security Council Resolution 579 contain provisions
condemning acts of abduction. 49 While these provisions were non-
binding when they were adopted, portions of the Declaration,
including its condemnation of abductions have since been adopted by
the United States. 50 Thus, the argument could be made that Matta-
Ballesteros's abduction violated international law, if not directly, than
at least in spirit. As a result, the U.S. Marshals' participation in the
abduction should have prompted the court to exercise its supervisory
powers to deter such illegal conduct in the future. 51
The majority's reasoning lost additional strength when it cited
United States v. Valo? 52 and United States v. Fieldini 53 as authority
supporting its decision not to exercise its supervisory powers.2 54  As
the concurrence noted, both Valot and Fielding were framed in the due
process terms of the Toscanino/Lujan exception. 5 5 Thus, although
these cases had their place in the majority's decision not to apply that
exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, 56 they were out of place in a
discussion of the court's supervisory powers.
The majority would have had a much stronger argument for its
decision not to exercise its supervisory powers if it only had adhered
to Supreme Court precedent defining the scope of the supervisory
247 854 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
248 Bush, supra note 11, at 959 & n.109. Applying the reasoning of Garcia to the Matta-
Balesteros case, one might argue that the U.S. Marshals' abduction of Matta-Ballesteros
became a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994) at the moment they crossed into the United
States. See Garcia, 854 F.2d at 344; supra note 227 and accompanying text. Carrying the
argument even further, the kidnapping-and the violation of the statute-would continue
as long as Matta-Ballesteros remained captive in the United States. See Garcia, 854 F.2d at
344; supra note 226 and accompanying text. Bringing the argument to its logical conclusion,
the U.S. courts would become participants in Matta-Ballesteros's kidnapping if they played
a part in extending his captivity. This argument has not been accepted by any court to date,
however, and the U.S. government has indicated its belief that international abductions by
U.S. agents do not violate any domestic laws. See Bush, supra note 11, at 959 n.109.
249 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948); United Nations Security Council Resolution 579, U.N.
SCOR, Mtg. 2,637, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/INF/41 (1986); supra notes 211-20 and accompanying
text.
250 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171,
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); see Rudy, supra note 173, at 792 n.4.
251 Both the majority and the concurrence noted that, due to the U.S. Marshals' special
relationship with the federal courts, their conduct in Matta-Balsteros was especially troubling.
See supra notes 74, 107 and accompanying text.
252 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980).
253 645 F.2d 719 (9th. Cir. 1981).
254 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 106, 178-88 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
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powers; it did not do so. Especially in light of the Court's increasing
reluctance to exercise its supervisory powers as evidenced by recent
decisions, 57 a more plausible argument could have been fashioned
for why the supervisory powers should not have been exercised in this
case. 58 Perhaps that is what really motivated Judge Noonan to
concur in the judgement rather than to dissent. Otherwise, it is
difficult to explain Judge Noonan's reasons behind his difficulty with
the intervening Eleventh Circuit decision.
C. The Concurrence's Concern with the Intervening Decision
In determining that Matta-Ballesteros had waived his supervisory
powers claim by not raising it in the intervening Eleventh Circuit
case,259judge Noonan apparently made the same mistake the govern-
ment did in the outset of this case. 6° Judge Noonan's argument that
"a decision of another federal court has broken the confinement
caused by the abduction" might best be described as a legal fiction
that, ironically, was dispensed with by the majority opinion. 261
The majority appeared to address Judge Noonan's concerns when
it held that only collateral attacks to final judgments were precluded,
not independent jurisdictional challenges. 6 2 Thus, the decision of
the Eleventh Circuit should have no preclusive effect on the Ninth
Circuit, since Matta-Ballesteros was not seeking to have his Eleventh
Circuit convictions overturned. 3  Judge Noonan's anti-climactic
conclusion to his otherwise eloquent defense of the supervisory powers
may have been fitting, however. It merely served to compound the
confusion other courts undoubtedly will face when they attempt to
decipher the message sent by the majority in United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros.
V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Matta-Ballesteros left some muddy
waters in its wake for other federal courts that undoubtedly will test the
257 See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
258 For example, the majority could have reasoned that-even if the court dismissed the
case against Matta-Ballesteros-the end result would be returning him to prison in the
Eleventh Circuit. Such an argument might negate some of the policy reasons behind the
availability of the supervisory powers in that Matta-Ballesteros would remain imprisoned
outside of his home country, and the deterrence effect on the U.S. Marshals would thus be
diminished. This might be analogous to making the claim of "harmless error" that prevented
an exercise of the supervisory powers in United States v. Hasting. See United States v. Hasting,
461 U.S. 499 (1983).
259 United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567 (11th. Cir. 1991); supra notes 108-11 and
accompanying text.
260 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
261 See Matta-Balesteros, 71 F.3d at 775 (Noonan, J., concurring).
262 Id. at 762 n.2.
263 See id.
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limits of their supervisory powers again in the future. Because the
majority hopelessly entangled due process considerations in its analysis
of the supervisory powers, it missed the opportunity to condemn an act
that clearly violated norms of international law. Further, the majority
passed up the chance to test the limits of its supervisory powers head
on, and to protect the integrity of the courts in the process.
The muddled opinion of Matta-Ballesteros may have an unintended
consequence, however. An argument, such as that fashioned by the
concurrence, might be made that-because the Ninth Circuit did not
squarely address the limits of its supervisory powers due to its
confusion regarding due process and treaty issues-the door still
remains open for courts to test the limits of their supervisory powers
in the future. Such courts would need to avoid the traps that ensnared
the majority in Matta-Ballesteros, however. They must face only those
restrictions on their supervisory powers that are imposed by the
Supreme Court, however extensive such restrictions may be, and not
those unnecessarily brought about due to confusion with other
potential jurisdictional challenges.
Regardless of how other courts eventually interpret the Ninth
Circuit's decision, foreign countries would be well advised to rethink
their extradition treaties with the United States in light of Matta-
Ballesteros. As U.S. courts become less willing to refuse jurisdiction-be
it through an exercise of their supervisory powers or through other
exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine-it is clear that only express
provisions in treaties prohibiting abduction as an alternative to
extradition stand any chance of achieving dismissals in cases where
federal agents have acted improperly. Of course, such a reworking of
extradition treaties might come at the expense of additional restric-
tions on extradition-an unfortunate result in an age when interna-
tional cooperation in the war on crime is imperative. The alternative,
however-allowing U.S. agents to run roughshod over the rights of
their citizens-cannot be all that appealing.
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